

CSS25 FINAL - FALL 2010 - 12/23/10.

1. (a)

	x_1	x_2	x_3	1
$x_4 =$	1	0	1	-2
$x_5 =$	4	-1	0	1
$z =$	-2	3	1	0

$x_5 = 0$



	x_1	x_4	x_3	1
$x_4 =$	1	0	1	-2
$x_2 =$	4	-1	0	1
$z =$	10	-3	1	0

Scheme II

	x_1	x_2	1
$x_4 =$	1	1	-2
$x_2 =$	4	0	1
$z =$	10	1	0

dual simplex



	x_1	x_4	1
$x_3 =$	-1	1	2
$x_2 =$	4	0	1
$z =$	9	1	2

optimal!

$$x = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \\ 2 \end{pmatrix} \Rightarrow z^* = 2$$

$$(b) \quad \min_{(x, \epsilon)} \epsilon \quad \text{s.t.} \quad -\epsilon \leq Ax - b \leq \epsilon$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \min_{(x, \epsilon)} \epsilon \quad \text{s.t.} \quad Ax + \epsilon e \geq b \\ -Ax + \epsilon e \geq -b$$

	x_1	x_2	ϵ	1
x_3 :	1	3	1	-2
x_4 :	2	-1	1	-2
x_5 :	4	7	1	-10
x_6 :	-1	-3	1	2
x_7 :	-2	1	1	2
x_8 :	-4	-7	1	10
z :	0	0	1	0

Since x_1, x_2 are free (so is ϵ actually, but we can treat it as a nonnegative variable) we would start by doing "Scheme II" pivots to move x_1, x_2 to become row labels

2.

	x_1	x_2	1	t
$x_3 =$	-1	0	-4	-1
$x_4 =$	1	1	0	2
$z =$	1	2	0	0

eg any $t \leq -4$
 clearly gives a nonempty
 feasible region

can get "initial t " by eyeballing, or
 solving a "Phase I problem" of the form

$$\min_{(t, s, x_0)} x_0 \quad \text{st.} \quad Ax + x_0 e \geq b + t h$$

$x \geq 0, x_0 \geq 0, t \text{ free}$

Following the second strategy, we have
 the following:

	x_1	x_2	x_3	x_0	1
$x_3 =$	-1	0	-1	1	-4
$x_4 =$	1	1	2	1	0
$z =$	1	2	0	0	0
$z_0 =$	0	0	0	1	0

t free - exchange
to sink, as per
Scheme II



	x_1	x_2	x_3	x_0	1
$t =$	-1	0	-1	1	-4
$x_4 =$	-1	1	-2	3	-8
$z =$	1	2	0	0	0
$z_0 =$	0	0	0	1	0

move to bottom



	x_1	x_2	x_3	x_0	1
$x_4 =$	-1	1	-2	3	-8
$z =$	1	2	0	0	0
$z_0 =$	0	0	0	1	0
$t =$	-1	0	-1	1	-4

direct simplex on
 z_0 row



	x_1	x_2	x_3	x_0	1
$x_2 =$	1	1	2	-3	8
$z =$	3	2	4	-6	16
$z_0 =$	0	0	0	0	0
$t =$	-1	0	-1	1	-4

optimal with $t = -4$

Returns to original tableau, and solve for

$t = -4$

over

	x_1	x_2	1	t
$x_3 =$	-1	0	-4	-1
$x_1 =$	①	1	0	2
$z =$	1	2	0	0

$t = -4$: apply dual simplex

↑
↓

	x_4	x_2	1	t
$x_3 =$	-1	①	-4	1
$x_1 =$	1	-1	0	-2
$z =$	1	1	0	-2

not optimal yet

	x_4	x_3	1	t
$x_2 =$	1	1	4	-1
$x_1 =$	0	-1	-4	-1
$z =$	2	1	4	-3

optimal for $4-t \geq 0 \Rightarrow t \leq 4$
 $-4-t \geq 0 \Rightarrow t \leq -4$

\Rightarrow for $t \in (-\infty, -4]$,
 solution $x(t) = \begin{pmatrix} -4-t \\ 4-t \end{pmatrix}$

$z(t) = 4 - 3t$

as t increases through -4 , second row of tableau becomes infeasible.

According to dual simplex, there is no suitable pivot column \Rightarrow the problem is infeasible for $t \in (-4, \infty)$.

Conclusion

t	$x(t)$	$z(t)$
$(-\infty, -4]$	$\begin{pmatrix} -4-t \\ 4-t \end{pmatrix}$	$4 - 3t$
$(-4, +\infty)$	infeasible.	

3. (a) $2x_1 - 2x_2 - 2u_1 + 2 = 0$
 $-2x_1 + 8x_2 - u_1 = 0$
 $0 \leq 2x_1 + x_2 - 4 \perp u_1 \geq 0$

(b) set $\begin{pmatrix} z_1 \\ z_2 \\ z_3 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \\ u_1 \end{pmatrix}$

	z_1	z_2	z_3	1
$w_1 =$	2	-2	-2	2
$w_2 =$	-2	8	-1	0
$w_3 =$	2	1	0	-4

pivot z_1, z_2 to side, pivot w_1, w_2 to top and delete.

	w_1	z_2	z_3	1
$z_1 =$	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	1	-1
$w_2 =$	-1	6	-3	2
$w_3 =$		3	2	-6

	w_2	z_3	1
$z_1 =$	$\frac{1}{6}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$-\frac{1}{6}$
$z_2 =$	$\frac{1}{6}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$-\frac{1}{6}$
$w_3 =$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$-\frac{1}{2}$

rearrange rows and artificial

	z_3	z_0	1
$w_3 =$	$\frac{2}{2}$	1	-7
$z_1 =$	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	$-\frac{1}{2}$
$z_2 =$	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	$-\frac{1}{2}$

Phase I pivot

	x_3	u_3	1	
$z_0 =$	$-\frac{7}{2}$	1	7	\leftarrow
$z_1 =$	-2	1	$\frac{17}{2}$	
$z_2 =$	-3	1	$\frac{20}{3}$	

↑

	x_3	u_3	1
$z_3 =$	$-\frac{2}{7}$	$\frac{2}{7}$	2
$z_1 =$	$\frac{4}{7}$	\vdots	$\frac{5}{3}$
$z_2 =$	$\frac{6}{7}$	\vdots	$\frac{2}{3}$

$$\frac{17}{2} - \frac{-14}{-7} = \frac{17}{2} - 4 = \frac{5}{2}$$

$$\frac{20}{3} - \frac{-21}{-7} = \frac{20}{3} - 6 = \frac{2}{3}$$

Solution $x = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{5}{3} \\ \frac{2}{3} \end{pmatrix} \quad u = (2)$

(c) if the constraint becomes an equality, KKT conditions are:

$$2x_1 - 2x_2 - 2u_1 + 2 = 0$$

$$-2x_1 + 8x_2 - u_1 = 0$$

$$2x_1 + x_2 - 4 = 0$$

which is still satisfied by $x = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{5}{3} \\ \frac{2}{3} \end{pmatrix}$ and $u = (2)$
 So the solution remains the same.

4. (a) Expected loss for Player I:

$$x' Ay = \begin{pmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \\ x_3 \end{pmatrix}' \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 & -1 \\ -1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & -1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} y_1 \\ y_2 \\ y_3 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$= x_1(y_2 - y_3) + x_2(y_3 - y_1) + x_3(y_1 - y_2)$$

(b) If $y \neq (\frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3})$ then we have that at least one of $y_2 - y_3$, $y_3 - y_1$, $y_1 - y_2$ is strictly negative. Set the component x_i of x corresponding to the most negative such value to 1, and the other two components of x to zero, to get a negative expected loss for Player I.

(c) $x' A \bar{y} = x' 0 = \bar{x}' A \bar{y}$ for any strategy vectors x
 $\bar{x}' A y = 0' y = 0$ for any strategy vector y
So the conditions for a Nash eq hold, i.e.
 $x' A \bar{y} \geq \bar{x}' A \bar{y}$ for all strategies x
 $\bar{x}' (-A) y \geq \bar{x}' (-A) \bar{y}$ for all strategies y .

(d). NO. Since $\bar{y} \neq (\frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3})$ we have as in (a) that there exists \hat{x} s.t.

$$\hat{x}' A \bar{y} < 0.$$

Since $0 = \bar{x}' A \bar{y}$, Player I can improve their payoff by switching from \bar{x} to \hat{x} , hence (\bar{x}, \bar{y}) cannot be a Nash equilibrium.