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Analys: Vietnam Should Get Asean Help



   Monday, Mar 31, 1997: Vietnam Should Get Asean Help
   
   HONG KONG (WSJ) -- The latest offshore row between China and Vietnam
   is enough to ring alarm bells throughout the region. Briefly, China is
   at it again.
   
   After repeatedly promising not to aggravate the situation in disputed
   parts of the South China Sea, China began exploratory drilling this
   month off the central Vietnamese coast in waters claimed by Hanoi.
   More troubling than the argument over this particular site is the
   pattern of Chinese behavior represented by the episode.
   
   For much of the 1990s, China has proclaimed a benign policy, only to
   engage in a series of provocative acts. When confronted with its
   contradictory stance, Beijing has issued placatory statements that
   stress its desire for the peaceful resolution of disputes and
   cooperation with its neighbors.
   
   The last exchange was in 1995, when the Philippines discovered that
   China had occupied Mischief Reef in a part of the Spratly Islands
   claimed by Manila. Beijing sought to explain away the foray and
   followed up with a pledge to abide by international law, which
   translated into ratification last July of the 1982 United Nations
   Convention on the Law of the Sea.
   
   China's drilling east of Da Nang, begun on March 7, makes a mockery of
   the convention.
   
   "There is too much of a gap between words and actions," says Mark
   Valencia, a senior fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu. "It is
   just one time too many."
   
   Although Vietnam is the only country to protest, others have reason to
   worry about Beijing's adventurism. A crucial question for the
   international community is what sort of power China will become next
   century, specifically whether it will abide by international rules, or
   try to rewrite them.
   
   More immediately, other Southeast Asian governments that claim all or
   part of the Spratlys -- Malaysia and Brunei as well as the Philippines
   -- must realize they are likely to feel Chinese pressure at some
   stage. To protect their interests, they should forge a common position
   through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
   
   The annual Asean-China political consultation, to be held in Huang
   Shan in Anhui province in the middle of next month, is the ideal
   occasion to take up the issue. It was at the first consultation two
   years ago that Asean overrode Chinese objections and delivered a
   forceful message about Mischief Reef.
   
   Those who doubt the need for a strong, collective stand should
   consider what has happened since then. Despite the unprecedented Asean
   demarche, the Chinese continue to occupy the stilted structures they
   built on Mischief Reef. Chinese warships regularly visit them, even as
   Beijing stands by its original explanation that the buildings are to
   shelter fishermen and were erected without the knowledge of the
   central government.
   
   To the Filipinos, the four separate platforms, with their satellite
   dishes and communications gear, still look like a naval support post.
   And, most galling, the Chinese refuse to discuss the subject with
   Manila.
   
   Thus does Beijing adhere to a South China Sea strategy appropriately
   described as "creeping assertiveness."
   
   The current clash doesn't involve territory. Nor does it have anything
   to do with the Spratlys. It is about maritime jurisdiction and who has
   the right to hydrocarbon, fishery and other resources.
   
   China and Vietnam are both entitled to a 200-nautical-mile
   (371-kilometer) Exclusive Economic Zone under the Law of the Sea
   Convention. Where such zones overlap, boundaries should be determined
   on the basis of equitable principles.
   
   Hanoi says China is drilling 64.5 nautical miles from the nearest
   point on the Vietnamese coast and more than 70 nautical miles from
   Hainan Island, the nearest Chinese land. Hanoi contends the area is on
   Vietnam's continental shelf, while Beijing insists the work is being
   carried out on China's continental shelf and within that country's
   EEZ.
   
   In fact, it is impossible for outsiders to determine the exact
   location of the drilling without being given the full coordinates. But
   most analysts think the site is probably on Vietnam's side of a median
   line drawn between the two territories, which is the most obvious way
   to equitably divide the area.
   
   Even without establishing which of them has the superior case, nearby
   countries are disturbed by China's attitude. "Making unilateral moves
   of this nature is not helping the dispute any," says a senior
   Southeast Asian official.
   
   By going ahead with exploration, China is breaching numerous explicit
   and implicit undertakings. For instance, it embraced the principles of
   the 1992 Asean Declaration on the South China Sea, which calls on all
   parties to exercise restraint in order to create "a positive climate
   for the eventual resolution" of competing jurisdictional and
   sovereignty claims.
   
   And the Law of the Sea Convention obliges ratifying governments with
   overlapping zones to negotiate while doing nothing to jeopardize or
   hinder a permanent settlement.
   
   To the contrary, Beijing initially dismissed Hanoi's calls for urgent
   and unconditional meetings of experts to try and resolve the matter.
   Only last week did Beijing back off a bit and say that it will
   consider Vietnam's suggestions.
   
   Privately, Vietnamese sources say the government at first tried to
   approach China quietly in an effort not to harm their
   sometimes-difficult ties. But Hanoi reluctantly went public on March
   16 after Beijing refused to discuss the matter, the sources say.
   
   One course open to Vietnam is to seek support from its six allies in
   Asean. It is an option Hanoi should exercise if China doesn't change
   its tune quickly.
   
   When Vietnam joined the grouping in 1995, some in Asean worried that
   Hanoi might try to involve Asean in Vietnam's longstanding
   disagreements with China over their land border and rights to the Gulf
   of Tonkin. Hanoi hasn't, however, relying instead on bilateral working
   groups to tackle those problems.
   
   "But now, this is the South China Sea," says the Southeast Asian
   official. "It is a matter of concern" to others, who fear Chinese
   action could provoke conflict and lead to instability in a
   strategically important corner of the world crossed by vital trade
   routes.
   
   The Vietnamese government has briefed Asean ambassadors based in
   Hanoi. They, in turn, have drafted a proposed Asean position paper
   calling on China to halt its exploration.
   
   While the draft has been sent to Asean capitals for consideration, it
   is a long way from being adopted. Vietnam, for a start, hasn't yet
   asked for formal Asean backing.
   
   Relations between Asean and China are otherwise excellent, a state of
   affairs that both should try to preserve, though not at any cost.
   Allowing China to pick off one member at a time would prove costly in
   the long run.
   
   If China has any diplomatic judgment, it will stop drilling and start
   talking. If not, Asean must present a united front and a powerful
   argument for Beijing's immediate withdrawal when senior officials face
   their Chinese counterparts in a few weeks time.
   
   In any event, Asean should express a sentiment that goes to the heart
   of serious friendship: China cannot go on saying one thing and doing
   another.