

CS540 Introduction to Artificial Intelligence

Lecture 22

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August 8, 2022

Traveler's Dilemma

Quiz


A6

- Two identical antiques are lost. The airline only knows that its value is at most 100 dollars, so the airline asks their owners (travelers) to report its value (non-negative integers, ≥ 2). The airline tells the travelers that they will be paid the minimum of the two reported values, and the traveler who reported a strictly lower value will receive 2 dollars in reward. If you are one of the travelers, what will you report?

$$\begin{array}{r}
 98 \leftarrow \frac{100}{99} \\
 100 \leftarrow 98
 \end{array}
 \quad
 \begin{array}{r}
 99 \rightarrow 100
 \end{array}$$

Traveler's Dilemma, Rationalizability

Quiz



no matter
what the other
player picks

100 is never
the best response

99 is never a
best response.

rationalizable

Summary

Discussion

- Adversarial Search:
 - 1 Sequential Move Games: Minimax \rightarrow DFS on the game tree.
 - 2 Sequential Move Games: Alpha-Beta Pruning \rightarrow DFS to keep track α and $\beta \rightarrow$ prune the subtree with $\alpha \Rightarrow \beta$.
 - 3 Simultaneous Move Games: Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies (Rationalizability).
 - 4 Simultaneous Move Games: Nash Equilibrium.

Guess Average Game

Motivation

- Write down an integer between 0 and 100 that is the closest to two thirds (2/3) of the average of everyone's (including yours) integers.

$$\frac{2}{3} \cdot \underline{100} \approx 66$$

any $\geq 66 \rightarrow$ never best action

all players will pick $0 \rightarrow 66$

any $\geq 44 \rightarrow$ never best

Guess Average Game Derivation

Motivation

$[0, 1]$ \rightarrow rationalizable. \leftarrow

Rationalizability

Motivation

- An action is 1-rationalizable if it is the best response to some action.
- An action is 2-rationalizable if it is the best response to some 1-rationalizable action.
- An action is 3-rationalizable if it is the best response to some 2-rationalizable action.
- An action is rationalizable if it is ∞ -rationalizable.

Rationalizability Example

Quiz

- Both players are MAX players. Which actions are rationalizable for the ROW player?

—	A	B	C
A	(2, 4)	(3, 7)	(4, 5)
B	(1, 2)	(5, 4)	(2, 3)
C	(4, 1)	(2, 8)	(5, 3)
D	(3, 6)	(4, 0)	(1, 9)

97
=

Row

B, C, C,

A, B, C,

Solution of game

Best Response

Definition

- An action is a best response if it is optimal for the player given the opponents' actions.

$$br_{MAX}(s_{MIN}) = \operatorname{argmax}_{s \in S_{MAX}} c(s, s_{MIN})$$

$$br_{MIN}(s_{MAX}) = \operatorname{argmin}_{s \in S_{MIN}} c(s_{MAX}, s)$$

Nash Equilibrium

Definition

- A Nash equilibrium is a state in which all actions are best responses.

Nash Equilibrium Example 1

Quiz

- Find the value of the Nash equilibrium of the following zero-sum game.

zero-sum game.

↓ MIN

—	I	II	III
I	-4	-7	-3
II	9	1	7
III	-6	-1	5

MAX

Nash equilibrium

Nash Equilibrium Example 1

Quiz

- Find the value (of MAX player) of the Nash equilibrium of the following zero-sum game.

MIN

—	I	II	III
I	(-4, 4)	(-7, 7)	(-3, 3)
II	(9, -9)	(1, -1)	(7, -7)
III	(-6, 6)	(-1, 1)	(5, -5)

MAX

Nash

Nash Equilibrium Example 2

Quiz

- Find the value of the Nash equilibrium of the following zero-sum game.

Q7
—

↓ ↓ min

—	I	II	III
I	1	2	3
II	4	5	6
III	7	8	9

max →

- A: 1 , B: 3 , C: 5 , D: 7, E: I don't understand

D: 7

Nash

best response of Row player

Prisoner's Dilemma

Discussion

- A simultaneous move, non-zero-sum, and symmetric game is a prisoner's dilemma game if the Nash equilibrium state is strictly worse for both players than another state.

—	C	D
C	(x, x)	(0, y)
D	(y, 0)	(1, 1)

$$y > x > 1$$

- C stands for Cooperate and D stands for Defect (not Confess and Deny). Both players are MAX players. The game is PD if $y > x > 1$. Here, (D, D) is the only Nash equilibrium and (C, C) is strictly better than (D, D) for both players.

Prisoner's Dilemma Derivation

Discussion

Properties of Nash Equilibrium

Discussion

- All Nash equilibria are rationalizable.
- No Nash equilibrium contains a strictly dominated action.
- Rationalizable actions (the set of Nash equilibria is a subset of this) can be found by iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions.
- The above statements are not true for weakly dominated actions.

Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium

Definition

- A mixed strategy is a strategy in which a player randomizes between multiple actions.
- A pure strategy is a strategy in which all actions are played with probabilities either 0 or 1.
- A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium for the game in which mixed strategies are allowed.

Rock Paper Scissors Example

Discussion

- There are no pure strategy Nash equilibria.
- Playing each action (rock, paper, scissors) with equal probability is a mixed strategy Nash.

$$\frac{1}{3} \quad \frac{1}{3} \quad \frac{1}{3}$$

Rock Paper Scissors Example Derivation

Discussion

Battle of the Sexes Example

Quiz

- Battle of the Sexes (BoS, also called Bach or Stravinsky) is a game that models coordination in which two players have different preferences in which alternative to coordinate on.

BoS

—	Bach	Stravinsky
Bach	(x, y)	$(0, 0)$
Stravinsky	$(0, 0)$	(y, x)

Battle of the Sexes Example 1

Quiz

- Find all Nash equilibria of the following game.

		I $\frac{5}{8}$	II $\frac{3}{8}$
P	I	(3, 5)	(0, 0)
1-p	II	(0, 0)	(5, 3)
		q	1-q

$$q = \frac{5}{8}$$

Row:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{I:} & \quad 3 \cdot q \\ \text{II:} & \quad 5(1-q) \end{aligned}$$



$$3q > 5(1-q)$$

$$3q = 5(1-q)$$

$$5(1-q) > 3q$$

Battle of the Sexes Example 1 Derivation 1

Quiz

COL: I: $5p$
II: $3(1-p)$

BR { I
mix
II

$5p > 3(1-p)$
 $5p = 3(1-p)$
 $5p < 3(1-p)$

$\frac{3}{8}$
 $\frac{5}{8}$

p
 $1-p$

—	I	II
I	(3, 5)	(0, 0)
II	(0, 0)	(5, 3)

$\frac{5}{8}$

$\frac{3}{8}$

$p = \frac{3}{8}$

Nash Theorem

Definition

- Every finite game has a Nash equilibrium.
- The Nash equilibria are fixed points of the best response functions.

Summary

Discussion

- Adversarial Search:
 - 1 Sequential Move Games: Minimax \rightarrow DFS on the game tree.
 - 2 Sequential Move Games: Alpha-Beta Pruning \rightarrow DFS to keep track α and $\beta \rightarrow$ prune the subtree with $\alpha \Rightarrow \beta$.
 - 3 Simultaneous Move Games: Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies (Rationalizability) \rightarrow Remove dominated actions for each player \rightarrow Repeat.
 - 4 Simultaneous Move Games: Nash Equilibrium \rightarrow Compute the best response \rightarrow Find strategies (pure or mixed) that are mutual best responses.