Nash Equilibrium

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### CS540 Introduction to Artificial Intelligence Lecture 22

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Based on lecture slides by Jerry Zhu, Yingyu Liang, and Charles Dyer

August 9, 2022

Nash Equilibrium

Fixed Point

## Traveler's Dilemma

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## Traveler's Dilemma, Rationalizability

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#### Summary Discussion

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### Guess Average Game

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### Guess Average Game Derivation

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## Rationalizability

- An action is 1-rationalizable if it is the best response to some action.
- An action is 2-rationalizable if it is the best response to some 1-rationalizable action.
- An action is 3-rationalizable if it is the best response to some 2-rationalizable action.
- An action is rationalizable if it is  $\infty$ -rationalizable.

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## Rationalizability Example

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#### Best Response Definition

• An action is a best response if it is optimal for the player given the opponents' actions.

$$\begin{aligned} br_{MAX}\left(s_{MIN}\right) &= \operatorname*{argmax}_{s \in S_{MAX}} c\left(s, s_{MIN}\right) \\ br_{MIN}\left(s_{MAX}\right) &= \operatorname*{argmin}_{s \in S_{MIN}} c\left(s_{MAX}, s\right) \end{aligned}$$

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### Nash Equilibrium

• A Nash equilibrium is a state in which all actions are best responses.

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## Nash Equilibrium Example 1

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## Nash Equilibrium Example 1

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#### Nash Equilibrium Example 2 Quiz

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### Prisoner's Dilemma

• A simultaneous move, non-zero-sum, and symmetric game is a prisoner's dilemma game if the Nash equilibrium state is strictly worse for both players than another state.



C stands for Cooperate and D stands for Defect (not Confess and Deny). Both players are MAX players. The game is PD if y > x > 1. Here, (D, D) is the only Nash equilibrium and (C, C) is strictly better than (D, D) for both players.

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### Prisoner's Dilemma Derivation

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## Properties of Nash Equilibrium

- All Nash equilibria are rationalizable.
- No Nash equilibrium contains a strictly dominated action.
- Rationalizable actions (the set of Nash equilibria is a subset of this) can be found be iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions.
- The above statements are not true for weakly dominated actions.

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# Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium

- A mixed strategy is a strategy in which a player randomizes between multiple actions.
- A pure strategy is a strategy in which all actions are played with probabilities either 0 or 1.
- A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium for the game in which mixed strategies are allowed.

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### Rock Paper Scissors Example

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### Rock Paper Scissors Example Derivation

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## Battle of the Sexes Example

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## Battle of the Sexes Example 1 $_{Quiz}$

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### Battle of the Sexes Example 1 Derivation 1

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## Nash Theorem

- Every finite game has a Nash equilibrium.
- The Nash equilibria are fixed points of the best response functions.

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#### Summary Discussion