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CS880 - Algorithmic Mechanism Design Course
CS 880: ALGORITHMIC MECHANISM DESIGN
Fall 2020
Algorithmic mechanism design is a subfield of game theory at the intersection of economics, optimization, and algorithm design. In this course we will discuss developments in this area over the last 20 years.
Instructor: Prof. Shuchi Chawla
Meeting times: The first two lectures will be on 9/2 and 9/9 at 9:30-11AM CT. Starting the week of September 14, lectures will be held on Mondays at 4 pm CT.
Meeting location: Online on Zoom (password emailed to all registered students)
Scribe template: here
Project information and ideas: here
Important note: If you are not a registered student but would like to sit in my classes, please send me email and I can give you access information.
Schedule (with readings and refs)
Week 1: (9/2 and 9/9) Introduction; Different auction formats; Equilibrium concepts; Revelation Principle; Combinatorial auctions
- Refs: MDnA book chapters 1 and 2; AGT book chapters 11 and 12.
- Handwritten lecture notes: here and here
- Lecture video: here and here
- Scribe notes: here (unedited)
Week 2: (9/14) Wrap-up combinatorial auctions; Revenue maximization in Bayesian settings
- Refs: MDnA book chapters 2 and 3; Sections 2, 3.1, and 3.2 of this survey
- Handwritten lecture notes: here
- Lecture video: here
- Scribe notes: here (unedited)
No class on 9/21.
Week 3: (9/28) Myerson's mechanism; Ironing; Simplicity versus Optimality
- Refs: MDnA book chapters 3 up to and including Section 3.3; and 4 up to and including Section 4.4; these three papers: HR09, CHK07, AHN+15.
- Handwritten lecture notes: here
- Lecture video: here
- Scribe notes: here (unedited)
Week 4: (10/05) Simplicity versus Optimality
- Refs: MDnA book chapter 4 up to and including Section 4.4; these three papers: HR09, CHK07, AHN+15.
- Handwritten lecture notes: here
- Lecture video: here
- Scribe notes: here (unedited)
Week 5: (10/12) Multi-parameter mechanism design
- Refs: Article by Daskalakis; Paper on unit-demand buyers by Chawla, Hartline, and Kleinberg; Paper on duality by Cai, Devanur, and Weinberg
- Handwritten lecture notes: here
- Lecture video: here
- Scribe notes: here (unedited)
Week 6: (10/19) Simplicity versus Optimality in Multi-parameter mechanism design
- Refs: Paper on additive buyers by Babaioff, Immorlica, Lucier, and Weinberg; Paper on heterogeneous buyers by Chawla and Miller
- Handwritten lecture notes: here
- Lecture video: here
- Scribe notes: here (unedited)
No class on 10/25. (Sign-up for project meetings and work on your project.)
Week 7: (11/2) Simplicity versus Optimality in Multi-parameter mechanism design
- Refs: Section 4.2 in this survey; Paper on unit-demand buy-many setting by Briest, Chawla, Kleinberg, and Weinberg; Paper on general buy-many setting by Chawla, Teng, and Tzamos.
- Handwritten lecture notes: here
- Lecture video: here
- Scribe notes: (to be posted)
No class on 11/9.
Week 8: (11/16) Blackbox reductions
- Refs: (to be posted)
- Handwritten lecture notes: (to be posted)
- Lecture video: (to be posted)
- Scribe notes: (to be posted)
Week 9: (11/23) TBA
- Refs: (to be posted)
- Handwritten lecture notes: (to be posted)
- Lecture video: (to be posted)
- Scribe notes: (to be posted)
Further topics
- Revenue maximization in the Bayesian setting; revenue equivalence; Myerson's mechanism
- Blackbox reductions
- Multi-parameter revenue optimal mechanism design; ex-ante relaxation; approximations; prophet inequalities
- Multi-parameter revenue optimal mechanism design: duality based approaches
- Prior independent and prior robust mechanism design
- Inference and learning in mechanism design
- Non linear settings and objectives
- Non-truthful mechanism design and price of anarchy
- Mechanism design without money
Homework
- Hwk 1: Out Sep 28, due Oct 12. pdf
- Hwk 2: Out Oct 19, due Nov 2. pdf
- Hwk 3: Out Nov 9, due Nov 23. pdf