[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Vietnam's Aging Troika
Hello folks,
The following article is published in the Sydney Morning
Herald today (3rd April 97) re views of a journalist on the ageing
of leadership in Vietnam. The commentary was written by David
Jenskins, an Asian watcher for the newspaper. Jenkins is a
relatively young lad and has track record in Asian affairs
reporting. I have previously personally clashed with him (and
others) publicly in this newspaper on issues related to VN.
The article has been edited slighly to be suitable for
posting in VNSA.
Tuan
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Excerpt from
Vietnam's Aging Troika
by David Jenkins
Sydney Morning Herald 3 April 97
More than half of Vietnam's 75million people are under the
age of 21, which means they were born after the so-called
"American war" ended in 1975. By way of contrast, the Big Three
in the Politburo have been around since they joined the anti-
French struggle in the 1930s. Do Muoi, the General Secretary of
the party, is a 80-year-old who left school at 14 to repair and
repaint doors along the narrow, tree-lined road from Hanoi to
Haiphong.
An apparatchik who had responsibility for Hanoi's attempt
to bring about the "socialist transformation" of trade and
industry in the South in the mid-1970s, Do Muoi is now identified
with the policy of doi moi, or renovation, under which the
Communist Party is busily discarding the fundamental tenets of
communism and pinning its hopes for survival on a sort of
Clayton's capitalism.
The number two man in the party, President Le Duc Anh, 76, a
general who commanded the Vietnamese army in Cambodia and who
represents the powerful military constituency, which is threatened
by the liberalising economic reforms, has been sidelined by a
stroke since November and is not expected to resume his official
duties.
Number three in the pecking order is Prime Minister Vo Van
Kiet, 75, a respected economic reformer who has been a party
member since 1938 and who is reportedly keen to step down - but
only if Do Muoi goes too.
The problem for Vietnam is that it is not easy to find
suitable replacements for these men.
The ruling troika, be it never so grey and uninspiring,
preserves a deft balance between the nation's three key regions
(North, Centre and South), its two main ideological groupings
(economic reformers and conservatives) and its two dominant
institutions (party and army). Do Muoi is a party bureaucrat from
the north, Anh a conservative army officer from the centre, Kiet
a reform- minded civilian from the south.
Although it was widely believed that all three would step
down during the 8th Party Congress last June, that did not
happen. From all accounts, it proved too difficult to cobble
together a new team which maintained the necessary balance. But
change cannot be too long delayed and may come soon after the new
National Assembly is elected in July.
The man widely tipped as the next General Secretary of the
party is Lieutenant General Le Kha Phieu, 66, one of five key
members of the Politburo and Director of the General Political
Department of the Army.
A former divisional political commissar who is as closely
identified with the party as he is with the army, Phieu has
impeccable class credentials, having emerged from a "pure peasant"
background.
His military credentials are less immediately apparent. In
an army which boasts any number of competent senior officers,
Phieu has no special claim to fame. Nevertheless, he has had a
meteoric rise through the ranks, having been plucked from
obscurity in 1986 and having achieved a place on the party
secretariat only five years later.
Phieu, who is storming the countryside, always in the
newspapers, always on television, poking his nose into a wide
range of policy issues, appears to be every inch the hardliner,
deeply concerned about internal security and stability.
Brusque to the point of rudeness and immensely ambitious, he
has made many enemies. According to some analysts, he has now
wrecked any chances he may have had of securing the top position
in the party. Others believe he is powerful enough for his
unpopularity not to matter.
If Phieu were to stumble in his bid to become General
Secretary, National Assembly chairman Nong Duc Manh, 57, could
emerge as a compromise candidate. Unlike the others on the 19-
member Politburo, Manh is a member of an ethnic minority, which
would not necessarily improve his prospects. On the other hand, a
rumour continues to circulate that he is the illegitimate son of
Ho Chi Minh, which does him no harm.
In an attempt to get to the bottom of these stories,
Australia's Ambassador in Hanoi, Sue Boyd, who is nothing if not
direct and who keeps a life-sized bust of Ho Chi Minh on her
embassy desk, once asked Manh if he was indeed Uncle Ho's son.
The answer was noncommittal.
Who will replace the ailing Anh as President? At this
stage, the frontrunner seems to be Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh
Cam, 68, a man of bland self-assurance who started out as a
Russian-language interpreter and who went on to become Hanoi's
ambassador in Moscow, a key post at a time when the Soviet Union
was Vietnam's principal international backer and paymaster.
Cam has a demonstrated competence in international affairs -
he is given the credit for recent diplomatic achievements,
including normalisation of relations with Washington and
Vietnam's membership of ASEAN - and useful linguistic gifts,
having added French and English to his repertoire. This could
serve him well given that Vietnam is not only opening up to the
world but about to host a major gathering of Francophone
countries. That said, most analysts believe Cam would be a fairly
weak figurehead President, not a force in his own right, like
Anh. One of the others whose name has been mentioned as
President is the elderly Defence Minister, General Doan Khue.
The son of a wealthy district chief from Central Vietnam, Doan,
74, is a hardliner who, like Phieu, made his name as a political
officer, not a fighting general. With his army background, he
wouldn't have much chance unless Phieu were to self-destruct on
his way to the general secretaryship.
A third name on "possible presidents" list is that of Nong
Duc Manh. What about the prime ministership, the third of the
three key jobs? It seems logical and appropriate that Kiet's
successor as Prime Minister should be a Southerner with an
economic and reformist bent. There are several suitable
candidates.
The first and most obvious is Deputy Prime Minister Phan Van
Khai, 64. Khai looked a shoo-in for the position a year ago but
took a bit of a pasting when his son ran into what were
euphemistically described as "business difficulties". The fact
that Khai has managed to hold on to his job as Deputy Prime
Minister suggests that he has weathered those storms.
Another possible candidate is Deputy Interior Minister
Nguyen Tan Dung, 48, who last year emerged from relative
obscurity to become the fifth man on the Standing Board of the
Politburo. A Southerner who built his career in the party, Dung
appears to have close links to Kiet, which many see as reassuring
given that the other three members of the standing board are
hard-liners.
Of late, Dung has been making a lot of speeches about
"equitisation", the Vietnamese code word for privatisation. A few
days after one such speech, in an illustration that the internal
battles go on, Do Muoi went out of his way to stress the
importance of the State sector, thus emphasising the central,
rather depressing theme of last year's party congress.
A third man who has been mentioned as a possible replacement
for Kiet is Truong Tan Sang, also 48, the party boss in Ho Chi
Minh City, still the fly wheel that drives the economy.
A man of force and vision who has been responsible for much
of the progress in the South, Sang has been a member of the
Politburo since last year. But he has not spent any time in the
North and has been telling colleagues he is happy where he is.
Besides, in a nation which retains an almost Confucian reverence
for age, he, like Dung, is likely to be considered too young and
too inexperienced for such a post.
Given the country's continuing obsession with getting the
factional balance right, it would be wrong to expect any sudden
shifts in Vietnamese policy. Hanoi's new leaders - whoever they
may be - will continue to dump the leaden ballast of Marxist dogma
over the side of the gondola, albeit in fits and starts. As they
do, the economic balloon will continue to rise.