Graduate/undergraduate students interested in working with me: please read this before contacting me.
(Not so) Recent happenings
- Ben Miller won the CS department's Cisco fellowship for 2016-17 and 2017-18. Congratulations, Ben!
- Balu Sivan's Ph.D. thesis
the 2014 ACM SIGecom Doctoral Dissertation award, and the CS
department's outstanding graduate student research
award. Congratulations Balu!
- Check out the brief survey on
Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design by Balu Sivan and myself here.
Interests: design and analysis of algorithms,
algorithmic game theory and mechanism design, combinatorial and
stochastic optimization. I am also interested in algorithmic issues in
networks and machine
learning. Please see my publications for more details.
Sponsors: I am grateful for the generous support of the National Science Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and Microsoft Research.
Selected recent publications and preprints
(see complete list on dblp)
Algorithmic mechanism design
- Mechanism Redesign, under submission. This journal version combines and improves upon the EC'14 and EC'16 papers below.
- Pricing for Online Allocation: Beyond Subadditive Values, under submission.
- Aversion to Uncertainty and Its Implications for Revenue Maximization, under submission.
- Truth and Regret in Online Scheduling, EC'17.
- Stability of Service under Time-of-Use Pricing, STOC'17.
- Mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex-ante relaxation, EC'16.
- A/B testing of auctions, EC'16.
- Simple pricing schemes for consumers with evolving values, (Previously: "How to sell an app?"), SODA'16 (+ talk at GAMES'16).
- Mechanism design for data
- Approximate revenue
maximization in interdependent value settings, EC'14 (+ talk at GAMES'16).
- Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling, STOC'13.
- Auctions with Unique Equilibria, EC'13 and AdAuctions'12.
- On the impossibility of black-box transformations in mechanism
- Optimal Crowdsourcing
Contests, SODA'12; invited to Games and Economic Behavior.
- Bayesian mechanism design for budget-constrained agents, EC'11.
- The power of randomness
in Bayesian optimal mechanism design, EC'10; to appear in Games
and Economic Behavior.
- Sequential posted pricing and multi-parameter mechanism design, STOC'10.
- Pricing randomized
allocations, SODA'10; invited to Journal of Economic Theory.
Past and present advisees
Current advisees: Benjamin Miller, Dimitris Paparas, Yifeng Teng.
Undergraduate alumni: Huck Bennett (NYU),
Boyan Li (CMU), Andrew Morgan (Wisconsin)
Teaching & Service
Current course: Algorithms for Massive Datasets (CS 880)
CS 520 Intro to Theoretical
Computer Science: Spring 2008
CS 577 Introduction to Algorithms: Fall 2006, Spring 2010, Fall
2010, Spring 2012, Fall 2012, Fall 2014, Spring 2016, Spring 2017
CS 787 Advanced Algorithms: Fall 2007, Fall 2009, Spring 2013, Fall 2015, Fall 2016
CS 880 Topics in Theory: Spring 2007
(Approximation Algorithms), Spring 2011 (Algorithmic Game Theory), Spring 2015 (Beyond Worst-Case Analysis)
CMU 15-859 Randomized Algorithms: Fall 2004
Program Committees: FOCS'06, WINE'07,
STOC'08, EC'08, EC'09, WINE'09,
SODA'11, EC'11, FSTTCS'11, EC'12, APPROX'12,
ITCS'13, STOC'13, EC'13, SAGT'13, EC'14, APPROX'14, FOCS'14, WWW'16, EC'16, ICALP'16, NetEcon'16, EC'17, HCOMP'17.
Organization committees: First Workshop on
Bayesian Mechanism Design (WBMD'11), First Workshop on Algorithmic Game
Theory and Data Science (Colocated with ACM EC'15 at FCRC'15), First Workshop on Mathematical Foundations of Human Computation (Colocated with HCOMP'16).
Shuchi Chawla received her Ph.D. from Carnegie Mellon University and her
B.Tech. from the Indian
Institute of Technology, Delhi. She has held postdoctoral or
visiting positions at Stanford University, Microsoft Research Silicon
Valley, Microsoft Research Redmond, and the University of
Washington. She is the recipient of an NSF Career award and a Sloan
Foundation fellowship. She currently serves on the editorial boards of the SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics, ACM Transactions on Algorithms, and ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation.
Please note: I get more email every day than I can respond to. If
you email me and don't receive a response within 2-3 days, please
send me a reminder.
Office: 4373 Computer Science
Phone: (608) 890 0027
Fax: (608) 262 9777
Computer Sciences Department
University of Wisconsin - Madison
1210 W. Dayton Street,
Madison, WI 53706.
Email: shuchi (AT) cs.wisc.edu